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Background: African horse sickness (AHS) is a major, Culicoides-borne viral disease in equines whose introduction
into Europe could have dramatic consequences. The disease is considered to be endemic in sub-Saharan Africa.
Recent introductions of other Culicoides-borne viruses (bluetongue and Schmallenberg) into northern Europe have
highlighted the risk that AHS may arrive in Europe as well. The aim of our study was to provide a spatiotemporal
quantitative risk model of AHS introduction into France. The study focused on two pathways of introduction:
the arrival of an infectious host (PW-host) and the arrival of an infectious Culicoides midge via the livestock trade
(PW-vector). The risk of introduction was calculated by determining the probability of an infectious animal or vector
entering the country and the probability of the virus then becoming established: i.e., the virus’s arrival in France
resulting in at least one local equine host being infected by one local vector. This risk was assessed using data from
three consecutive years (2010 to 2012) for 22 regions in France.
Results: The results of the model indicate that the annual risk of AHS being introduced to France is very low but
that major spatiotemporal differences exist. For both introduction pathways, risk is higher from July to October and
peaks in July. In general, regions with warmer climates are more at risk, as are colder regions with larger equine
populations; however, regional variation in animal importation patterns (number and species) also play a major role
in determining risk. Despite the low probability that AHSV is present in the EU, intra-EU trade of equines contributes
most to the risk of AHSV introduction to France because it involves a large number of horse movements.
Conclusion: It is important to address spatiotemporal differences when assessing the risk of ASH introduction and
thus also when implementing efficient surveillance efforts. The methods and results of this study may help develop
surveillance techniques and other risk reduction measures that will prevent the introduction of AHS or minimize
AHS’ potential impact once introduced, both in France and the rest of Europe.
Keywords: African horse sickness, Equine movements, Import risk assessment, Risk of introduction, Culicoides,
Quantitative risk, MidgeBackground
African Horse Sickness (AHS) is a highly fatal viral
vector-borne disease that is transmitted among equine
hosts by Culicoides midges (Diptera: Ceratoponidae) [1, 2].
It affects all extant Equidae, but morbidity and mortality
vary among species: as many as 90 % of infected horses die
within one week, while infection is largely subclinical in
zebras [3, 4]. AHS virus (AHSV) is an orbivirus, and there* Correspondence: celine.faverjon@vetagro-sup.fr
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of cross-protective immunity [4]. AHS is considered to be
endemic in sub-Saharan Africa, where the zebra acts as a
reservoir [5]. Rare outbreaks have occurred in North
Africa, western Asia, and the Iberian Peninsula, where they
have persisted for only a few years [6]. The last outbreak in
Europe occurred in the Iberian Peninsula, between 1987
and 1990, and caused the death of more than 1,350 horses,
either directly or as a result of control measures [7].
The recent introduction into northern Europe of blue-
tongue virus (specifically BTV-8, in 2006 [8]) and
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the risk that AHSV will be introduced to Europe [10]. It
is particularly crucial to conduct a risk assessment ana-
lysis for France, as the country encompasses different
ecosystems, including Mediterranean zones, where Culi-
coides imicola—considered to be the major vector of AHSV
worldwide—is very abundant, and non-Mediterranean
temperate zones, where Culicoides obsoletus—a potential
AHSV vector—is dominant [11, 1, 12]. Moreover, France
contains between 900,000 and 1 million equines, is the
world’s 4th largest exporter of horses, and has a horse
industry that produces around 12 billion euros of rev-
enue per year [13]. If AHS arrived in France, it could
have devastating consequences, similar to those predicted
for other EU members such as the United Kingdom (UK)
[14], Ireland [15], and the Netherlands [16].
Introduction risks have recently been quantitatively
assessed for similar vector-borne diseases, such as BTV
[17–19], West Nile Virus [20, 21] and eastern and
western equine encephalomyelitis [22], Venezuelan
equine encephalitis [22], and Japanese encephalitis [22].
However, these studies mostly took into account only
one pathway of introduction; different introduction
pathways have rarely been examined in tandem. To ex-
plore AHSV in particular, a qualitative risk assessment
analysis that accounted for multiple pathways of intro-
duction was conducted in the UK [23]; the results sug-
gested that the most likely pathway of introduction
would be the arrival of an infectious host. This pathway
of introduction was also examined by a quantitative risk
assessment analysis of the likelihood that AHSV would
be introduced to the Netherlands [24]. As AHSV is
closely related to BTV and shares the same vectors,
information on BTV introduction pathways could be
helpful when assessing the risk that AHSV will be intro-
duced to Europe. Several studies have indicated that
long-distance, wind-mediated transport of Culicoides
might have played a role in the introduction and spread of
several BTV strains in Europe [25–27]. In particular, stud-
ies aimed at understanding the introduction of BTV-8
have indicated that the legal importation of an infec-
tious host is unlikely to have caused the epidemic ob-
served in 2006 [28, 29]. It is thought that the risk
presented by other pathways of introduction, such as
the introduction of a single Culicoides midge through
intracontinental transport and trade networks [19], is
low. Integrative studies are required to quantify and
combine information on different pathways of introduc-
tion to better understand and confront the risks posed
by vector-borne diseases [30].
In this study, we performed a quantitative risk assess-
ment analysis of the introduction of AHSV to France.
We focused on two pathways of introduction: the arrival
of an infectious host and the arrival of an infectiousCulicoides midge via the livestock trade. Introduction is
defined here as the probability that an infectious host
or vector will be released in such a way that at least
one local host ends up infected by one local vector
(establishment). The subsequent spread of the disease
is not examined. As the initial infection of a local host
will depend on spatial (e.g., the number of local hosts)
and temporal factors (e.g., seasonal vector abundance),
the probability of establishment will vary depending on
location and time period. The objective of this study was
to quantify the risk of introduction associated with a
given time period and region for the two pathways of
introduction under consideration, which could thus offer
insight into temporal and regional variation in introduc-
tion risk. Furthermore, evaluating these two pathways of
introduction could help optimize risk-mitigating control
and surveillance measures.
Methods
Risk associated with introduction pathways and initial
assumptions
To quantify the risk of AHSV introduction associated
with the two introduction pathways, risk assessment
analysis was conducted using the framework developed
by de Vos et al. [31]. Although other potential pathways
of introduction exist [23], we restricted ourselves to the
two most probable: the arrival of an infectious equine
and the arrival of an infectious Culicoides midge. Only
the legal, registered horse trade was taken into account
because no data exist on the illegal horse trade. In the
analysis, only the introduction of an adult vector was
considered since transovarial transmission of the virus
has not been observed in Culicoides [1, 11, 15]. Culi-
coides midges are hematophagous and tend to stay close
to their mammalian hosts (mainly large mammals
[32, 33]). They are rarely found in vehicles of trans-
port (such as aircraft or trucks) or merchandise when
insect surveys are conducted [21, 34]. It is also uncom-
mon to find Culicoides associated with plants or plant
material [29, 35]. As a result, only Culicoides entering the
country via the livestock trade were included in the
analysis. Hence, the two main pathways of AHSV intro-
duction examined in this study were: the legal import-
ation of infectious equines (PW-host) and the arrival of
infectious Culicoides as a consequence of livestock trade
(PW-vector).
An introduction pathway was constructed to detail all
the steps required for AHSV to be successfully released
and become established in France (Fig. 1). This intro-
duction pathway was evaluated using a stochastic risk
simulation model. Monthly introduction probabilities
were calculated using data from three consecutive years
(2010 to 2012) for each area of arrival within France. A
total of 22 such areas were defined.
Fig. 1 Introduction pathways. Steps required for the successful release and establishment of AHSV resulting in at least one local host infected by
one local vector
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First, the world’s countries were grouped into three cat-
egories as per De Vos et al. [24]: (1) high-risk regions
where the disease is considered to be endemic; (2) low-
risk regions that have experienced AHS outbreaks in the
past and/or where the main vector, C. imicola, is present;
and (3) very-low-risk regions (all other countries). Since
the main vector is not present in very-low-risk regions, we
assumed that it is very unlikely that they would produce
exports containing infectious vectors; consequently, very-
low-risk regions were ignored for this pathway of intro-
duction. In addition, because EU regulations differ for
imports arriving from EU versus non-EU countries [36],
we also distinguished between (a) EU members and (b)
non-EU members. Five departure regions were thus de-
fined (Fig. 2). Imports from non-EU countries were placed
in one of two categories based on their point of arrival in
Europe: whether they were shipped directly to France or
whether they arrived via another EU country, because ani-
mals stopping in another country were considered to
experience longer traveling times. Furthermore, equine
imports were grouped according to species: (1) horses;
(2) donkeys, mules, and hinnies; and (3) zebras.
The model
PW-host: introduction via an infectious host
The probability of AHSV being introduced by species
i from region j to area k in month m via an infectioushost (PW-host), (introHijkm), was defined as the prob-
ability of at least one infectious host of species i from re-
gion j arriving in area k in month m and of this arrival
being followed by virus transmission to a local vector
and host. This overall probability was defined as:
P introHijkm
  ¼ 1− 1−P relHijkm
  P estHijkm
  eqijkm
ð1Þ
Where P(relHijkm) is the probability of an infectious
equine of species i from region j being released in
area k in month m; P(estHijkm) is the probability of
an infection becoming established in month m given
the release of one infectious equine of species i from
region j in region k; and eqijkm is the number of
equines of species i imported from region j arriving
in area k in month m.
Release probabilities, P(relHijkm), were species specific
since virus prevalence is different in different equines
across the areas of origin, and different species show dif-
ferences in their susceptibility to the disease. For in-
stance, the release probability of horses is lower because
horses have a shorter viremic period than do donkeys
and zebras. P(relHijkm) also depended on the moment z
of infection; the protective measures implemented be-
fore embarkation [36, 37]; and the duration of transport
from region j to area k (tjk). For imports coming from
non-EU countries, tjk was assumed to equal 1 day for
Fig. 2 Countries of the world classified regarding AHS occurrence and import regulations
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2 days for animals arriving via another EU country
(initial air travel followed by land transport or subse-
quent air travel). For intra-EU trade, tjk was assumed to
be between 1–2 days (uniform distribution) because air
and land transport are supposed to be used with equal
frequency and France is assumed to be a maximum of
2 days away from everywhere else in EU [38]. P(relHijkm)
was defined as :
P relHijkm
  ¼
Xw
z¼1 length period zð Þ  P relHijkmz
  
Xw
z¼1 length period zð Þ
ð2Þ
where P(relHijkmz) is the probability of release for an
equine i infected during z. For a given region j, there
were a total of w different time periods z during which
an equine could become infected, depending on the
importation procedures implemented for region j (e.g.,
before quarantine or during quarantine but before the
first serological test, etc.). If j was a high-risk region,
then P(relHijkmz) was defined as:
P relHijkmz
  ¼ P inf ijmz
 
 P virijmz
 
 1−P CF1izð Þð Þ  1−P CF2izð Þð Þ
 1−P clinijmz
   1−P transijkz
  
ð2:bisÞ
Where P(infijmz) is the probability of equine i being in-
fected during time period z; P virijmz
 
is the probabilityof equine i infected during z becoming viremic after
transport; (1 − P(CF1iz)) and (1 − P(CF2iz)) are the prob-
abilities of equine i infected during z not being detected
by the first and second serological tests, respectively;
(1 − P(clinijmz)) is the probability of equine i infected
during z not being detected by the clinical exam; and
(1 − P(transijkz)) is the probability of equine i infected
during z not being detected during transport.
The probability of establishment via PW-host was
defined as:
P estHijkm
  ¼ 1− 1−λHV  P survkmð Þ  bequik  λVH
 culikm
ð3Þ
where λHV and λVH are, respectively, the probabilities
of a vector feeding on an infectious host becoming
infected and of a host bitten by an infectious vector
becoming infected; P(survkm) is the probability of an
infected Culicoides midge surviving until its first in-
fectious blood meal; culikm is the number of vectors
feeding on an infectious imported host; and bequik is
the probability of a Culicoides midge biting an
equine in area k bequik depends on the vector’s prefer-
ence for equines as hosts and on the cattle-to-equine
ratio in area k.
The overall national and annual median probabilities
were calculated based on the monthly regional values.
The monthly national median probability of introduction
was thus defined as:
P introHijm
  ¼ 1−
Y22
K¼1 1−P introHijkm
   ð4Þ
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tion was defined as:
P introHij
  ¼ 1−
Y12
m¼1 1−P introHijm
   ð5Þ
The same formulas were used to define the probabil-
ities of release and establishment at the national and
annual levels. Using these formulas, the extreme values
of these probabilities were determined by using the esti-
mated the 5th and 95th percentiles for each region and
month.
For a more detailed description of the probabilities
and parameters used, see Additional files 1 and 2.
PW-vector: introduction via an infectious vector
Few data were found on the number of Culicoides
midges transported with livestock (equines and cattle)
over the distances of interest here; as a consequence, we
assumed that the numbers could not be very high with-
out having spurred notice and thus calculated the risk of
release assuming that one Culicoides was transported
with each animal. We defined the probability of estab-
lishment as the probability that this single vector was
able to cause the infection of at least one local equine
host by one local vector. P(introVjkm) was thus define as:
P introV jkm
  ¼ 1− 1−P relV jkm
  P estV jkm
  njkm
ð6Þ
where P(relVjkm) is the probability of a single infected
Culicoides from region j being released in region k in
month m; P(estVjkm) is the probability of establishment;
and njkm is the number of livestock (equines and bovines)
transported from region j to area k during month m.
The probability of release was defined as:
P relV jkm
  ¼ P inf culijm
  P transculijm
 
 P survtransjkm
 
ð7Þ
where P(inf_culijm) is the probability of a vector in re-
gion j becoming infected in month m; P transculijm
 
is
the probability of a vector being transported post in-
fection; and P(survtransjkm) is the probability of a
Culicoides surviving transport from region j to region
k. P(survtransjkm) was calculated assuming that transport
conditions do not affect Culicoides viability (worst case
scenario because the survival of insects is supposed to be
optimal during transport). If pest control is implemented
in region j, we reduced survival probabilities depending
on the efficiency of the pest control product (Protvect)
used. This was only the case for equines coming from
high-risk regions [36]. Since bovines are not consistently
and systematically disinfected before transport, we as-
sumed that no pest control was implemented for them.The probability of establishment via an infectied vector
was defined as:
P estV jkm
  ¼ P survarrivaljkm
  bequik  λVH
 1− 1−λVH  P survkmð Þ  bequik  λHV
 culikmh i
ð8Þ
where P survarrivaljkm
 
is the probability of an infected
vector surviving to its first infectious blood meal follow-
ing its arrival in area k.
The overall national and annual median probabilities
were calculated using the same procedures used to cal-
culate the PW-host probabilities.
For a more detailed description of the probabilities
and parameters used, see Additional files 2 and 3.
Input data
Because accurate registration data for horses were lack-
ing, the ratio of bovines to equines per area k (ρk ) was
estimated by combining information from different
databases. The 2010 census conducted by the French
Ministry of Agriculture [39] was the source for cattle
and equine abundances (horses kept in agricultural
settings) for each area and the IFCE-SIRE database [40]
provided additional estimates of equine abundance in
each area. Because it became mandatory to identify all
equines in France in 2012, this database is considered to
include all of the country’s equines; however, dead
horses are still present in the database and, as a result,
the number of equines is overestimated. Two ratios
were calculated—one using each of the values of equine
abundance—and ρk was estimated in our model as a
uniform distribution that ranged from the smallest to
the largest ratio calculated.
The number of bovines and equines transported to
France were obtained from TRACES, the TRAde
Control and Expert System, which monitors the trans-
port of animals and products of animal origin both into
and within the EU [41]. In our analysis, we only included
animals whose final destination was France.
Vector abundance was estimated using data from the
national surveillance system implemented in France
from 2009 to 2012—approximately 160 locations were
surveyed to follow the activity of Culicoides populations
[42]. The number of competent vectors feeding on a
given equine in area k during month m (Ckm) was mod-
eled using a truncated normal distribution; μ was the
average monthly number of Culicoides collected per
overnight trap (Culicoides imicola and members of the
Obsoletus complex), σ was the standard deviation, and
the minimum and maximum values observed were the
lower and upper bounds of the distribution, respectively.
Similar parameters were used in modeling efforts by de
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during month m in area k (Tkm) was modeled using a
truncated normal distribution; μ was the average
temperature of each month for each year (based on daily
average temperatures obtained from MARS-Agri4cast),
and σ was the standard deviation, and the 1st and 99th
percentile values were the lower and upper bounds of
the distribution, respectively.
Analyses were performed for the three consecutive
years included in the study: 2010, 2011, and 2012.
Calculations
Model calculations were performed in Microsoft Office
Excel 2010 and @Risk 6.1 [44]; 10,000 iterations were
run. The sensitivity analysis tool in @Risk was used to
evaluate the impact of stochasticity and uncertainty in
the input parameters on model results. The correlation
between the values of the input parameters and the
pathway-specific probabilities of introduction were cal-
culated (Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients).
The sensitivity of the model to the values of the input
parameters should have been very similar across all re-
gions and months because we used the same model
and input parameter estimates, except in the case of
the bovine-to-equine ratio, the temperature data, and
vector abundance. Indeed, the values of these three
parameters varied across regions and months (i.e., in a
given month, the vector abundance could vary greatly
in one region and little in another). Larger amounts of
variation could have a greater impact on the model
than lesser amounts of variation. The reasoning is the
same for the bovine-to-equine ratio, which also varied
across regions. When determining the overall prob-
ability of introduction, we thus chose to focus our sen-
sitivity analysis on the region-time period combinations
associated with the highest levels of risk and/or
uncertainty.
Results
Data on equine and bovine imports
TRACES data for 2010-2012 show that, on average,
1,300 equines arrived every year in France from non-EU
countries, including about forty donkeys (and no zebras).
Most of these animals (close to 80 %) passed through
another EU country before arriving in France. Imports
from high-risk regions represented an average of 1.6 %
of the total imports; imports from low- and very-low-
risk regions occurred at similar levels: 45.6 % and
52.4 %, respectively. By law, bovines cannot be imported
from non-EU countries.
The trading of registered horses within the EU is not
required to be reported to TRACES [36]. However, it is
nonetheless regularly disclosed: in the TRACES data-
base, more than 40 % of the equines traveling from otherEU countries to France were registered horses. It is im-
portant to note that, in most of the data on the equine
trade within the EU, no distinction is made between
horses and donkeys. As a consequence, the TRACES
database is somewhat limited in its ability to reveal
equine movements within the EU. These concerns aside,
according to the database, an average of 9,350 equines
arrived in France every year from 2010 to 2012; 65 %
came from very-low-risk regions, and 35 % came from
low-risk regions. In the case of bovines, all movements
are registered in the TRACES database. An average of
145,500 bovines arrived in France every year from 2010
to 2012; 61 % came from very-low-risk regions, and
39 % came from low-risk regions.Probability of release
The probability of release is defined as the probability of
an infectious equine or vector being released in a given
area. The overall annual median probability of release in
France was 3x10−3 for an infectious host (PW-host) and
ranged from 1.4 x10−2 to 3.6x10−2 for an infectious vec-
tor (PW-vector). Seasonal variation mostly resulted from
the fact that the risk of release is negligible during the
first half of the year, when low- and very-low-risk re-
gions are considered to be unlikely to experience AHS
outbreaks and equine imports from high-risk regions are
very rare. From July to December across all years, the
probability of release remained relatively constant; the
monthly median probability that an infectious host
would be released (PW-host) varied from 2.6x10−4 to
9.5x10−4, and the monthly median probability that an in-
fectious vector (PW-vector) would be released ranged
from 1.1x10−3 to 6.9x10−3. An exceptionally high peak
was observed in July 2011 due to arrival of several
horses from a high-risk country.
Areas varied greatly in their median release probabil-
ities due to differences in the type and number of
imports, but the annual probability of release for a given
area was similar over time. As a result, for a given path-
way of AHSV introduction, the areas most at risk
remained the same (see Fig. 3).Probability of establishment
We determined the probability of establishment for each
area of France, which was the probability that at least
one local host would be infected by a local vector after
the release of a single infectious host or vector. The
probability of establishment varied as a function of
temperature, vector abundance, the length of the equine
host’s viremic period, and the bovine-to-equine ratio
in arrival area k. In the case of the infectious vector,
P estV ijkm
 
also depended on the life span of the specific
Culicoides being transported. The risk of establishment
Fig. 3 Main at risk French areas for AHSV release, establishment and introduction per introduction pathways
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June and August (Fig. 4). Temporal and regional differ-
ences were observed—owing to variation in temperature
and relative host abundance—but some areas clearly faced
greater risks than others (Fig. 3).Overall risk assessment
The probability of introduction was obtained by combin-
ing the probability of release and the probability of
establishment. The median annual risk of introduction
due to an infectious host was almost constant across
Fig. 4 National probabilities of AHS establishment per introduction pathway and per year for France. Solid lines are the median values, large dash
lines the upper border and tiny dash lines the lowest border. NB: the results for zebras are similar to results for donkeys
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introduction due to an infectious vector varied from
4x10−5 to 6x10−5. These figures mean that, currently, the
annual risk that an infectious host will introduce AHSV
into France is approximately 1 in 2,000; there is a 1 in
16,666 to 25,000 chance that AHSV introduction will be
caused by an infectious vector. At the national scale, the
monthly probability of introduction was similar over
time, but the level of uncertainty was large (Fig. 5). The
probability of introduction was the highest in the sum-
mer; it peaked in July for both pathways of introduction
and in all three years. From November to June, the
probability of introduction was nil, except when animals
were imported from high-risk regions to the warmest
areas of France (e.g., Languedoc Roussillon in March
2012). When animals were imported to colder areas, the
probability of establishment was zero, making the prob-
ability of introduction zero (e.g., Basse Normandie in
March 2012). Introduction risk varied greatly across
space and time (see, for example, year 2012 in Fig. 6 and
Additional files 4 and 5) but, over the three years exam-
ined, some areas consistently had a higher probability ofintroduction (see Fig. 3). If it is assumed that an average
of one midge accompanies each large animal being
transported, both pathways can be combined to yield a
single probability of introduction (Fig. 7), to which infec-
tious hosts appear to be the main contributors.
The average contribution of each region of origin to
introduction risk is shown in Table 1. Intra-EU trade
contributes most to the risk of AHSV introduction via
the infectious host pathway; low-risk EU countries are
the largest contributors even though they are responsible
for a lower volume of imports compared with very-low-
risk EU countries. This pattern is explained by the high
number of equines traded within the EU and by the fact
that regulations governing intra-EU trade are less strict.
No zebras were brought into France during the period
we studied, and donkeys represented only 0.3 % of
recorded equine imports. Their average relative contri-
bution to AHSV introduction risk was 1.2 %. Animals
imported from high-risk regions account for only 0.02 %
of the large livestock arriving in France, and their
average contribution to AHSV introduction risk via in-
fectious vectors was 1.5 %. As a result, imports from
Fig. 5 National probabilities of AHS introduction per year and per introduction pathway for France. Solid lines are the median values, large dash
lines the upper border and tiny dash lines the lowest border
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introduction risk via infectious vectors. Furthermore,
cattle cannot be imported from outside the EU and, con-
sequently, most of the transport of large livestock takes
place within the EU (99.3 %). Given this fact and the fact
that regulations regarding vector control are identical in
all low-risk regions (EU and non-EU countries alike),
trade of large livestock within the EU is the main con-
tributor when it comes to the risk of AHSV being intro-
duced by an infectious vector.
Sensitivity analysis
A sensitivity analysis was performed for the two areas
identified in Fig. 7 as being at risk for AHSV introduc-
tion via the two introduction pathways: Ile de France
and Provence. The level of uncertainty surrounding the
risk of introduction was rather constant for both areas,
with one exception: the level of uncertainty was farhigher than average in Provence in October 2012 as a
result of major variation in local temperatures. The
results of the analysis are summarized in Figs. 8 and 9,
respectively, for the infectious host pathway and the in-
fectious vector pathway for July (higher risk month) and
October (late summer; characterized by lower risk and
large uncertainty for one area) in 2012.
As expected, the values of the input parameters had a
constant impact on the model’s results over time and
space, with only few exceptions. Furthermore, the most
important input parameters mainly encompassed vari-
ability due to stochasticity (7 out of 10 parameters for
PW-host and 6 out of 8 for PW-vector) and, to a lesser
extent, uncertainty. Nevertheless, compared to its effects
in other areas and months, average monthly temperature
had a greater impact on the results for Provence in
October for both pathways of introduction. This pattern
was due to the fact that temperatures varied greatly in
Fig. 6 Monthly regional probabilities of AHS introduction into France from July to October 2012. Results for PW-host are presented in the upper
line and results for PW-vector in the lower line. Red: probability of introduction > 1E-05; Dark orange: probability of introduction >1E-06
and < 1E-05; Light orange: probability of introduction >1E-07 and < 1E-06; Yellow: probability of introduction >1E-08 and < 1E-07; White:
probability of introduction <1E-08
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level of uncertainty associated with the probability of
introduction in this area in this month and highlights
the large influence of temperature on the model’s
results.
Discussion
The model revealed that the annual risk of AHSV being
introduced to France was very low and relatively con-
stant for the pathways and years examined. The median
value for the introduction risk via imported infectious
equines (PW-host) was 0.0005; for infectious vectors
(PW-vector), median introduction risk varied from
4x10−5 to 6x10−5 across years, assuming that one
Culicoides midge arrived with each imported animal.
The PW-host estimate was very similar to that obtained
by de Vos and colleagues when they assessed the risk of
AHSV being introduced to the Netherlands [24]. The lat-
ter study did not distinguish between EU countries and
non-EU countries and only took into account competi-
tion horses; however, it did include horses traveling
through the Netherlands to reach other countries. The
PW-vector estimate was highly dependent on our as-
sumption that only one Culicoides midge was associated
with each imported animal. Indeed, the higher the num-
ber of associated Culicoides, the higher the probability of
introduction. If it is the case that, on average, one Culi-
coides is associated with each imported animal, then the
risk tied to this pathway of introduction is ten times
lower than that tied to infectious hosts. As a result, AHS-
free countries only face significant introduction risks if
the number of Culicoides being transported is large asthat required for BTV, as shown by Napp et al. for Spain
[19]. On the one hand, our assumption of one Culicoides
per animal could be overly pessimistic because midges
could exit the transport vehicle after feeding and thus
not reach the animal’s final destination. On the other
hand, it could be an overly optimistic assumption be-
cause large numbers of Culicoides may be found on large
animals. Because data are lacking on the number of Culi-
coides being transported with mammalian hosts, it is
difficult to determine how each pathway of introduction
contributes to overall introduction risk.
Our study indicates AHSV establishment in France
may be favored from May to October. This finding is
consistent with the results obtained by Lo Iacono et al.
for the UK [45], by Martinez-Lopez et al. for Spain [46]
and by de Vos et al. for the Netherlands [24]. In France,
the favorable period for AHSV establishment is longer
than in the UK (June to September) and the Netherlands
(June to August) but shorter than in Spain (April to
December), which is a logical consequence of climatic
differences. Such differences should be taken into ac-
count when AHSV introduction within Europe is ad-
dressed at a larger scale.
Major differences were found among French regions
and between introduction pathways. As expected, the
coldest regions with the smallest equine populations had
the lowest risk of AHSV introduction (e.g., Centre and
Auvergne). In contrast, the warmest regions were most
at risk for AHSV introduction (e.g., Aquitaine and Midi-
Pyrénées), as were colder regions with larger equine
populations (e.g., Basse Normandie and Ile de France).
Warmer regions faced higher levels of risk mostly
Fig. 7 Annual regional probabilities of AHSV introduction to France via PW-host and PW-vector. Low probabilities are defined as the
probabilities < 1E-06, medium probabilities as the probabilities between 1E-06 and 1E-05, high probabilities as the probabilities > 1E-05
Table 1 Average contribution (%) of departure regions to the AHSV introduction risk for France. Results are presented for both
pathways and compared to the total number of imports to France which are, for PW-host, the equine imports and, for PW-vector,
the large animals imports (equine and bovine)
Exporting region High risk Low risk Very low risk TOTAL
non-EU member EU member non-EU member EU member non-EU member EU member
PW-host Risk 0.82 3.3 63.2 4.3 28 7.6 91.2
Import 0.13 3.75 32.6 5.1 58.4 8.81 91
PW-vector Risk 1.5 98.5 / / /
Import 0.02 99.98 / / /
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Fig. 8 Correlation of the model input parameters with the probability of introduction of AHSV via PW-host. Results are presented for Ile de France
(light blue) and Provence (dark blue) in July and October 2012. Only input parameters with at least one correlation≥ |0.1| have been included in
the tornado charts. The underline parameters are the uncertain parameters; the bold parameters are both uncertain and variable due to stochasticity;
the others are only variable due to stochasticity
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ger equine populations increased risk in colder regions.
Nevertheless, if spatial differences were mainly deter-
mined by the probability of establishment, import-
related variation (number and species imported) also
played an important role, as seen in the Corse region:
even if climatic conditions are favorable, the probability
of introduction will be low if there are very few imported
animals. These results emphasize that it is important to
analyze spatiotemporal variation in risk when developing
efficient surveillance systems and optimizing control
measures. For instance, if there is a high risk that a
pathogen will be introduced by an infectious vector, in-
secticides should be applied before animals are
imported. In contrast, if there is a high risk that a patho-
gen will be introduced by an infectious host, quarantine
measures should be more stringent and/or extra testsFig. 9 Correlation of the model input parameters with the probability of in
France (light blue) and Provence (dark blue) in July and October 2012. Onl
included in the tornado charts. The underline parameters are the uncertain
to stochasticity; the others are only variable due to stochasticityshould be performed on horses coming from low-risk
regions.
We found that seasonal variation in temperature can
have a large impact on the risk of introduction because
it exerts a strong influence over vector abundance and
biology, which, taken together, determine a vector’s
capacity to transmit AHSV [3, 47]. The risk of ASHV
introduction was higher during periods characterized by
higher than average temperatures. This finding concurs
with results from work examining the introduction of
BTV-8 to northwestern Europe: the extreme temper-
atures during July 2006 may have contributed to its
widespread diffusion [48]. Therefore, rare, extreme
climatic events and, more generally, global warming
should have a large influence on the probability of
AHSV establishment, as has been shown for BTV [49, 50].
Given the progression of global warming, risk assessmentstroduction of AHSV via PW-vector. Results are presented for Ile de
y input parameters with at least one correlation ≥ |0.1| have been
parameters; the bold parameters are both uncertain and variable due
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changes.
Our study reveals that complete and accurate data on
the movements and distribution of the EU’s equine
population are not available: it is hard to trace horses
within the EU. The introduction of mandatory horse
passports in 2008 improved the situation but, apart from
rare exceptions [46], it is still difficult to follow the EU’s
equine population [51] and assessing the population’s
distribution and fluxes remains a challenge (see the UK
[52]). for an example). This is a major concern given that
the distribution of the equine population had an import-
ant impact on our results (see the ratio of bovines to
equines in Figs. 8 and 9); moreover, the number of
equines being imported is obviously highly correlated
with introduction probabilities. Furthermore, several
equine viruses are zoonotic (e.g., eastern and western
equine encephalomyelitis viruses, Venezuelan equine
encephalitis virus, and West Nile virus), and the risk that
they will be introduced to and spread within the EU is
definitely not negligible [22]. It is, in fact, currently
increasing; indeed, West Nile virus has already become
endemic in some regions [53]. Improving the traceability
of horses within the EU would thus be advantageous
when it comes to better assessing the risk posed by
AHSV and other zoonotic diseases.
The risk assessment model described in this paper ad-
dresses the risk of AHSV being introduced to France by
two pathways of introduction considered to be of
importance [23]. However, other pathways may also sub-
stantially contribute to introduction risk. Several studies
have highlighted that the wind may efficiently transport
Culicoides over long distances, both across sea [25, 54]
and land [55]; it might have been involved in the spread
of BTV in Europe [25–27]. Wind-mediated dispersal of
infected vectors might also have resulted in AHSV being
introduced to Cape Verde Island in 1944, Cyprus in
1960, the Middle East in 1960 and Spain in 1966 [56].
An extensive assessment of the role played by the wind
in spreading Culicoides midges and Culicoides-borne in-
fections across the Mediterranean Basin would elucidate
the importance of this pathway for AHS introduction.
However, the wind-mediated dispersal of AHSV is
most likely to occur in the south of France close to
low-risk regions, which is also where AHSV intro-
duction is most likely to occur via the pathways ex-
amined in this study. Therefore, we think that this
study accurately identifies the regions of France that
face the greatest risk of AHSV introduction. Further-
more, the risk that AHSV will be introduced via
wind-borne infectious Culicoides cannot be mitigated
by direct preventive measures, such as importation
restrictions. Instead, to be effective, control measures
would have to influence the probability of establishment;for instance, insecticides could be used to protect local
hosts against wind-borne vectors.
Our model provides a basis for creating a risk-based
surveillance system in France that focuses on the regions
and time periods associated with higher levels of AHSV
introduction risk. The model could also be used for
assessing risk and establishing surveillance procedures in
other European countries. This application is especially
important because our study has revealed that European
countries make the largest contribution to France’s
AHSV introduction risk (e.g., PW-host: 91.2 %). Indeed,
if an infection occurs in one European country but is
not detected, then it can easily spread to other European
countries because there is little verification and tracking
of equine movements within the EU. By implementing
a risk-based surveillance strategy in each country in the
EU, infections would have a higher probability of being
detected early on; as a consequence, the contribution of
fellow EU countries to introduction risk would decline
(see the probabilities of non-notified AHS occurrence
in low- and very-low-risk regions in Figs. 8 and 9).
By reinforcing the tracking of equine movements
within the EU, infection would also have less chance
to disseminate and the policy implications of an AHS
introduction will be more limited. Such strategies
could be a means of minimizing the risk and impact
of an AHSV outbreak for the entire European equine
industry.
Conclusion
We have developed a quantitative risk assessment model
to estimate the risk of AHSV being introduced to France
via the importation of infectious equines and infectious
Culicoides midges associated with large livestock. The
risk that AHS will be introduced to France is very low;
however, risk varies tremendously among the different
regions of the country due to variation in temperature
and equine population size. The regions most at risk are
those with the warmest climates as well as those that are
colder but that harbor larger equine populations. Intro-
duction risk is greatest from July to October and peaks
in July. Despite the low probability that AHSV is present
in the EU, intra-EU trade of equines contributes most to
the risk of AHSV introduction to France because it is
responsible for a large number of horse movements.
Spatiotemporal differences need to be addressed when
assessing the risk that AHSV will be introduced to a
given location and when developing and implementing
risk-based surveillance procedures. The methods and re-
sults of this study may help guide surveillance programs
and other risk-reduction measures aimed at preventing
the introduction of AHSV or minimizing its potential
impact once it has been introduced, both in France and
in other European countries.
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